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Abstract  
ASSESSING THEORY OF MIND IN CHILDREN WITH AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS 
AND CHILDREN WITH TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT 
by  
Sarita C. I. Austin 
!
!
Adviser: Valerie L. Shafer  
Theory of mind (ToM) is the cognitive mechanism that allows a person to make 
inferences about other person’s beliefs/knowledge. To date, a sizable portion of the research in 
ToM skills has involved assessment using false-belief tasks (FBT). FBT tasks are designed to 
examine people’s actions in order to determine whether their beliefs/knowledge take into account 
other person’s beliefs/knowledge.  The current study used an alternative behavioral task to FBT 
with children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and young typically developing (TD) 
children.  To date, a simple ToM task that has minimal linguistic and memory requirements has 
not been used with young children with ASD.  The current task is based on a procedure 
introduced by O’Neill (1996), which previously demonstrated the presence of ToM in children 
with TD.  Specifically, preschoolers in O’Neill’s study made inferences about adult knowledge 
and altered their communicative acts accordingly.  The current study presents the familiar social 
situation of requesting toys and minimizes the linguistic and cognitive demands of FBT while 
parents knowledge state fluctuate as they are asked to close their eyes for a portion of select 
trials.  Ten 2-3 year old children with ASD and ten 2-3 year olds with TD completed this study.   
The results of this study  did not replicate O’Neill’s findings, but did reveal that the TD 
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participants produced significantly more communication bids in terms of frequency and 
complexity than the ASD group.  The participants with ASD generally provided non- responses 
more often. Manipulating the caregivers’ knowledge state did not significantly affect the 
children’s communicative behavior in both groups in a way that suggests the presence of 
immature ToM. In addition, this study showed that ASD participants attended visually to their 
caregivers at a frequency approaching that of to the TD group.  A subset of children with ASD 
followed gaze during the experimenter’s instructions less frequently, but used notably more eye 
gaze without gesture to initiate communicative exchanges.  By examining both the presence of 
ToM and the precursors of ToM, the current study identifies potentially unique group patterns in 
the development and use of communicative acts, such as, gaze and gesture that support the 
development of ToM.  Overall, this study indicates that examining precursors to ToM may be a 
viable method for examining theory of mind in young children with and without ASD and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The phrase “theory of mind” was coined by Premack and Woodruff (1978) and is used to 
describe the cognitive mechanism that allows an individual to infer the mental state of others 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).  Theory of mind (ToM) allows an individual to have 
awareness that other people’s behaviors are guided by their thoughts and beliefs (Wellman, & 
Liu, 2004).  
There are two major categories of models have been proposed to explain the development 
of ToM are theory-shift models and performance-based models (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003).  
The theory-shift explanation suggests that ToM results from a shift in children’s ability to think 
about mental representations, rather than as a result of a more generalized development of 
cognition.  This shift in understanding mental states, which occurs around four years of age, 
seems to be the result of children’s increased understanding that mental states involve 
representations or organized internal cognitive systems that symbolize external reality (Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1994; Wellman & Gelman, 1998; Surian & Leslie, 1998).  Evidence to support the 
theory-shift model comes from Slaughter, and Gopnik (1996).  They provided feedback to 3-
year-old children while training them using tasks such as reporting their own or other’s desires 
and found that those children who received training performed better than their untrained peers 
on location change false belief, unexpected contents, and appearance-reality tasks post-training.  
This outcome showed that exposure to new information, not simply general maturation, could 
lead to changes in the understanding of mind. 
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Performance-based explanations suggest that young children do have a concept of belief, 
but are limited by general or specific cognitive factors and these other factors account for or 
contribute to failure on tasks which measure the ability to attribute false beliefs (Fodor, 1992; 
Leslie & Roth, 1993; Scholl & Leslie, 1999). The specific cognitive factors are usually 
characterized as executive functions (EFs) or the processes that underlie flexible goal-directed 
behavior (Duncan, 1986; Lezak, 1982).  Early emerging EFs, including inhibition and working 
memory are essential to thrive socially.  Increases in inhibition and working memory skills are 
observed from infancy and particularly during the 4 to 5 years old range.  Maturation for these 
skills leads to a better awareness of what strategies to use in various contexts.  Consistent with 
this, the performance-based models suggest that development of EF leads to changes in ToM 
around four years of age (Russell, 1996).  Improvement in performance on false belief tasks in 
younger children has been shown in studies where inhibition (Leslie, & Polizzi, 1998) and 
memory (Freeman, & Lacohee, 1995) have been manipulated.  For example, in Leslie and 
Polizzi’s (1998) study, four-year-olds who were told that a character wanted to avoid doing a 
particular behavior (e.g., did not want to make pet cat sick by putting fish in the wrong box), 
performed significantly poorer on false-belief questions versus true belief questions involving 
inhibition.  While Freeman and Lacohee (1995) showed that offering three-year-olds picture 
cues, helped them to recall their own false-belief in a task where they were presented with a 
candy box filled of candy and asked what they thought was it in after the pencils were revealed.  
The performance-based model supports the notion of variable ability to demonstrate ToM based 
on the cognitive demands of the task.  This model acknowledges that the limitations of an 
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assessment tool may play a role in young children’s ability to demonstrate ToM.  Several 
procedures that have been used for determining the presence of ToM may only indirectly test 
ToM. These procedures may reflect maturation of other cognitive abilities (e.g., attention, 
memory). Thus, failure on these tasks may indicate poor attention or memory, rather than poor 
ToM.   
Regardless of the model, there is consensus among most researchers that with the 
development of ToM comes the ability to interpret and predict the mental states of others and, 
subsequently to understand the causes of other’s behaviors (Premack, & Woodruff, 1978). 
!
Theory of mind in typical development 
 As discussed above, a number of studies have shown a variable pattern of performance 
on ToM tasks depending on the ages of the participants.  Precursors to ToM are actually seen as 
early as infancy in children within typical development.  For example, there is evidence that 
infants recognize the facial expression of  others (Barrera & Maurer, 1981; Browne, Rosenfeld, 
& Horowitz, 1977; La Barbera, Izard, Vietze, & Parisi, 1976).  They also demonstrate an ability 
to follow others’ gazes, indicating an understanding of shared attention and focus with others.  
Similarly, between 7-12 months of age, typically developing infants spontaneously point to items 
of mutual interest for purely social reasons.  This is known as proto-declarative pointing (Baron-
Cohen, 1991; 1993).   Research also suggests that some of the cognitive abilities necessary for 
succeeding in ToM tasks (e.g., joint attention- specifically initiating gaze and 3-point gaze shifts) 
are found by two years of age (Charman et al., 2000).  However, these abilities are emerging and 
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continue to develop into adolescence and possibly early adulthood (Bretherton, McNew, & 
Beeghly-Smith, 1981; Chandler, 1987; Kuhn, Amel, & O’Loughlin, 1988; Kuhn, Pennington, & 
Leadbeater, 1983; MacNamara, Baker, & Olson,1976; Perry, 1970; Shantz, 1983; Shultz, Wells, 
& Sarda, 1980; Shultz & Cloghesy, 1981).  This shared focus of individuals on an object (i.e., 
joint attention) is important in supporting an individual’s ability to identify the intentions of 
other.  
These early indices of intentional communication may be associated with later abilities 
related to ToM.  Carpenter and colleagues (1998) proposed that intentional communication, such 
as gestures and joint attention, is indicative of a child’s ability to ascribe mental states to others 
(Carpenter, Nagell, Tomsello, Butterworth, & Moore, 1998). A child may use communicative 
gestures and gaze to establish shared reference and attention solely because a child simply 
notices an object.  But this use may also be based on a need to share what the child believes to be 
new information with a communicative partner.  Making such a judgment would suggest that the 
child is taking into consideration the mental state of another.  By eighteen months, children with 
typical language development (TD) can predict the desires of others, noting that they may be 
different from their own.  In Repacholi & Gopnik’s (1997) study, children tasted foods and then 
observed an experimenter tasting the same foods then expressing happiness or disgust.  When the 
experimenter subsequently asked the child for “some” food, 18-month-olds offered those food 
items which the experimenter expressed happiness with even if that conflicted with the items 
they preferred. In contrast, their 14-month-old peers acted egocentrically and offered the 
experimenter  the foods that the children themselves preferred to eat.  So, a specific shift around 
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mind, as suggested in the theory shift models of ToM, was seen when children were taught about 
the desires of others through shared focus. 
Through joint attention, children begin to make associations about words and objects/
events and begin to convey their own intentions (Toth, Munson, Meltzoff, & Dawson, 2006).  
Eye gaze and protodeclarative pointing are crucial to the establishment of joint attention which is 
associated with to future peer interactions during school age (i.e., 10-12 years of age) (Sigman & 
Ruskin, 1999).  Specifically, stronger performance in joint attention tasks during the preschool 
years is associated with better peer interactions (e.g., ability to initiate and respond to play bids) 
during the school age years (Toth et al., 2006). Successful peer interactions during school age is 
highly related to a child’s ability to make inferences about the thoughts of their peers (i.e., what 
they believe, what their know, what they want).  From the first year of life to school age, gaze is 
actively used to monitor what a conversational partner is looking at and to determine if facial 
expressions and body language indicate that an alternation in turns and topics is warranted (and 
at later ages, if the meaning of words are nonliteral). The ability to use gaze to shift between 
people and objects is crucial to both responding to and initiating joint attention. Similarly, the 
ability to gesture and interpret the gestural communication of others is critical to initiating and 
responding to bids for joint attention, which plays a crucial role in developing ToM.  For these 





 Theory of mind and Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
The Coactive Organism Experience Theory of Autism suggests that ASD is caused by a 
neurodevelopmental disturbance resulting from an organism-environment interaction (Gottleib, 
& Halpern, 2002).  Specifically, it implies that genetic makeup leads to a lack of a bias for social 
input in children with ASD, which leads to less interest in responding to and less motivation to 
initiate joint attention, and reduced opportunities for experiences that would lead to typical 
neurological and behavioral development.  It is believed that the resulting atypically organized 
neural connections lead to an atypical trajectory of language and cognitive development.  
Abnormalities in early social experiences for children with ASD may contribute to poor 
development of ToM, specifically by limiting these children’s ability and opportunity to apply 
the context of their own internal state to that of another’s (Belmonte et al., 2004). 
Baron-Cohen (1988) also suggested that ToM deficits associated with ASD are linked to 
an inability to notice and connect to the mental and emotional states of one’s self and others.  
More specifically, the terms primary representations (i.e., concepts or beliefs about the physical 
world), secondary representations (i.e., beliefs about others’ beliefs), and metarepresentations 
(i.e., stepping away from the truth of a situation in order to consider an (other’s) idea, which may 
not be consistent with reality) were used to describe the individual mental states associated with 
experiencing the world individually and while taking into account how others are also 
experiencing the world (Baron-Cohen, 1988; Dennett, 1978; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Leslie, 1987; 
& Pylyshyn, 1978).  The development of primary representations allow children to orient 
themselves to the work and basic social skills like reciprocity and engagement.  As children 
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develop, we see that their ability to have secondary representations leads to higher-level 
communicative exchanges, like in Repacholi and Gopnik’s (1999) study earlier, when the 
children considered the desires of the examiner in deciding what type of communication bids to 
initiate at 1 1/2 years old.  After 4 years of age, children begin to manage metarepresentations  
more competently and are able to show increasingly stronger ToM skills as they navigate the 
social world comparing and contrasting their own beliefs to those of others. Baron-Cohen (1988) 
suggested that the ability to form metarepresentations is impaired in ASD and results in poor 
ToM and poor performance on ToM  tasks. There is some evidence that children with ASD can 
understand the basic desires of others, but have difficulty with deeper, more inferential mental 
states, such as beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 1993; Paul et al., 2014).  
In summary, during typical development precursors of ToM such as coordinated gaze and 
gesture are observed during the first year of life.  These skills allow children to associate  words 
with objects and events in their environment and share their own intentions with communicative 
partners.  The ability to do so in childhood is associated with increased success in peer 
interactions during school age, which requires the ability to consider the thoughts of others and 
know that their behaviors are guided by them.  Abnormal social experiences in children with 
ASD resulting from a lack of bias for social information may contribute to poor development of 
the skills that subserve ToM.  To better understand social communication patterns in children 




Assessing theory of mind 
Numerous assessment tasks have been designed to test ToM in ASD and typically 
developing populations (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Carlson, Moses & Hix, 1998; Freeman & 
Lacohee, 1995; Freeman, Lewis, & Doherty, 1991; Leslie, 2000; Lewis & Osborne, 1990; 
Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991; Moses, 1993; Perner, Leekham, & Wimmer, 1987; Siegal & Beattie, 
1991; Surian & Leslie, 1999; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Zaitchik, 1991).  Dennett (1978) 
proposed that the most exacting test of ToM would involve examining a person’s ability to 
understand another’s belief when that belief differed from reality and his own belief.  This led to 
development and use of false-belief tasks (FBT).   
The most popular of these is a location change FBT called the Sally-Anne test (See 
Appendix A). This is a version of Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) puppet play paradigm adapted by 
Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985).  FBTs examine people’s actions to determine whether their 
beliefs/knowledge take into account another person’s beliefs/knowledge. The Sally-Anne test 
specifically involved an experimental procedure in which subjects were presented with: 1) two 
dolls (Sally and Anne); 2) a naming question to make sure they could distinguish between the 
two characters; 3) a scenario in which Sally first places a marble in her basket and then leaves 
the room, at which time Anne switches the marble to her box; and 4) the question “Where will 
Sally look?” after Sally returned to the scene.  Pointing to the basket and accurately answering 
the reality question (i.e., “Where is the marble really?”) and the memory question (i.e., “Where 
was the marble in the beginning?”) question was scored as a “pass,” while pointing to the box 
with the marble resulted in a “fail” on the basis that the response was indicative of failure to 
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ascribe the doll’s mental state.  The task was also presented for a second trial using three 
different locations (the basket, the box, and the experimenter’s pocket).    
Results of Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) study suggest aberrant patterns in the ASD group’s 
ability to reason about the mental states of others based on the marked lower frequency of their 
correct responses to the belief question (as compared to the Down Syndrome and typically 
developing groups in the study).  The study involved 20 high-functioning “autistic” children, 14 
children with Down Syndrome, and 27 “clinically normal” preschoolers.  The mean 
chronological age for the groups was 11;11, 10;11, and 4;5 years respectively.  The mean 
nonverbal mental age (MA) for the “autistic” group was 9;3 years and the mean verbal MA was 
5;5 years.  The results of the study are more striking when considering that the group with Down 
Syndrome, in contrast, had mean nonverbal MA of 5;11 and verbal MA of 2;11 years. 
It has also been suggested that three-year-olds with TD have difficulty understanding 
their own false beliefs and comprehending the false beliefs of others. They accurately answered 
false-belief questions approximately 20% of the time in contrast with over 50% of the time by 
four years of age in a study by Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001).  Some attribute this 
performance to issues related to the ability of understanding more complex feelings (Hadwin & 
Perner, 1991).  For example, prior to five years of age, children may have difficulty 
understanding that surprise is due to an unexpected outcome.  While preschoolers may be able to 
understand the basic emotions (e.g., happy, sad) of others, this difficulty with understanding 
surprise reflects that understanding another’s emotional state becomes more challenging for this 
population when that emotional state is associated with an inaccurate belief about the 
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environment.  Bloom and German (2000) suggest that it is hard to decipher whether the difficulty 
that younger children have on FBTs is due to lack of ToM or due to the linguistic and memory 
demands of the tasks.  Several studies have highlighted linguistic and cognitive factors, such as 
conversational skills, memory, inhibitory control, that play a role in performance on FBTs 
(Carlson et al., 1998; Freeman & Lacohée, 1995; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Mitchell & Lacohée, 
1991; Roth & Leslie, 1998; Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Siegal & Peterson, 1994; Surian & Leslie, 
1999).  For example, in Siegal and Beattie’s (1991) study, 3-year-old children responded more 
accurately on FBTs when they were not required to make implicatures during conversation with 
the examiner (i.e., when they were asked “Where will the person look first?” versus when they 
were asked “Where will the person look?” and left to decide if the meaning of the question was 
“Where will the person need to look for the item?” or “Where will the person look first for the 
item?”).  In Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) study, the age range for the “clinically normal” group 
was 3:5-5;9 years and it was reported that 23 out of 27 children accurately answered the belief 
question.  However, the authors did not expand upon specific pass/fail patterns (i.e., those who 
answered the reality question correctly or incorrectly) in relation to chronological age (i.e., 
younger than four years versus four years and older) in the typical population.   
Although FBTs are useful tools for examining ToM in children with ASD, one must 
consider that adequate memory, inhibitory control, and conversational skills underlie successful 
performance on the traditional FBT and that each process has its own developmental time course.  
For example, understanding false-belief has been shown to develop later than knowledge access 
and immature memory or linguistic abilities can result in poor performance.  Thus, it is important 
 11
to examine the development of the processes supporting ToM using alternative methods that can 
minimize the requirements of later-maturing constructs. 
!
Variations of false-belief tasks 
Although there is much evidence for precursors for ToM existing within the first year of 
life, there is a debate regarding to what extent ToM is developed under three years of age.  Many 
studies using FBTs show an abrupt appearance of ToM at age 4, which may indicate that the 
tasks were not sensitive enough to detect the gradual emergence of ToM as posited in 
performance-based theories.  A larger percentage of children with TD under 4-5 years have been 
shown to fail FBTs in comparison with children with TD ages 6 years and older (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988).  Although FBTs are often used to investigate ToM, these tasks have several 
serious limitations.  Because they rely heavily on language comprehension, language production, 
and working memory, children’s failure on FBTs may simply reflect difficulties in linguistic 
competence and executive function, rather than decreased ToM.  During traditional FBTs, 
children are required to attend to and remember newly presented information, understand a 
variety of linguistic concepts, and make decisions.  More specifically, children are required to 
remember two new names for two new objects, understand possession, adverbs, sequential 
concepts, and wh- questions, and respond to a naming question on demand. 
There have been several variations of the FBT in the literature including the appearance-
reality, contents, deceptive pointing, and false-photograph tasks.  An appearance-reality task can 
involve showing children an object that looks like another, revealing the identity (which differs), 
 12
then asking what the object looks like and what it really is (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1986).  
One “contents” FBT involved asking children what was in a familiar box (which had a candy 
label) to which the most frequent response was “candy.”  When it was revealed that the box 
contained pencils, the children were then asked what someone else will think is inside.  
Researchers found that children passed at age levels similar to those found for the location 
change FBTs (4-5 years) (Gopnik & Astington, 1988).  In one version of a deceptive-point FBT, 
children were told to trick the experimenter by pointing to a location where an object was not 
hidden (Carlson et al., 1998).  In a false-photograph task, children were told stories about a 
character that took a photo of an item in a certain location and that the item was then moved 
while the photograph developed.  In the latter task, they were then asked where the object was, is 
now, and is in the picture (Sabbagh & Moses, 2006).   As a group, three to five-year-olds in the 
study performed better on a false-photograph task and more poorly on a false belief task as age 
decreased.  The false-belief task was significantly correlated to three executive function tasks, 
which required the use of inhibition and working memory while the false photograph task was 
not.  The results support the idea that more demanding (e.g., memory load) assessment tasks may 
affect the younger children’s ability to demonstrate ToM.   
Unfortunately, the linguistic (e.g., conversational skills) and cognitive (e.g., memory, 
inhibitory control) demands of these tasks are similar to those of the Sally-Anne test, and it has 
been shown that manipulation of these aforementioned factors does affect young children’s 
performance on FBTs (Carlson et al., 1998; Freeman & Lacohée, 1995; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; 
Mitchell & Lacohée, 1991; Roth & Leslie, 1998; Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Siegal & Peterson, 
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1994; Surian & Leslie, 1999).  For example, Surian and Leslie (1999) contrasted the 
performance of typically developing three -year olds with older children with autism (mean age 
13;8 years and mean metal age 7;4).  Both groups failed a standard FBT.  When asked a follow-
up question about where the girl looked “first,” 86% of the TD group answered accurately, while 
there was no improvement in the performance of the ASD group. This supports both the 
performance-based theories of ToM and the idea that other factors involved with 
metarepresentation may be affecting the performance of children with ASD on FBT (Surian & 
Leslie).  In addition to these variations of FBTs, several other types of belief tasks (e.g., not-
known-belief) have been used to examine ToM in preschool children (Wellman & Bartsch, 
1988), but the same cognitive and linguistic issues were also of concern in these tasks. 
In summary, failure of preschoolers on FBTs is likely to be related to the methodological 
approach of researchers.  In particular, the high demand on linguistic and memory skills, rather 
than immature ToM reasoning may underlie failure.  Thus, tasks that minimize the demands of 
these are factors are needed to examine the development of ToM in younger children and 
disordered groups. 
!
An alternative to false-belief tasks 
O’Neill’s (1996) two studies with typically developing two-year-olds present an 
alternative means of examining ToM in young children.  She employed a task with reduced 
linguistic and working memory demands. The studies looked at children’s requesting behaviors 
in relation to the knowledge of their caregiver.  Study 1 conducted with older two-year-olds 
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(mean chronological age 2;7 years) involved telling children that they could request toys from 
their parents, who would serve as their “helpers”, and that they could then throw the toys into a 
box. The action caused a bell to ring each time a toy was thrown in.  The children were then 
shown that the toys were being placed out of reach.  For each trial the parents were either in the 
room (with or without eyes closed) or out of the room.  If the child did not spontaneously request 
the toy they were prompted, "Tell mommy/daddy what you want her/him to do."  The second 
study was conducted with younger two-year-olds (mean chronological age 2;3 years) designed to 
reduce the amount of verbal communication required during the task by using identical 
containers and by not revealing the character (e.g., pig, duck) on the sticker before it was placed 
in the container.  These steps were taken to ensure that the children could not verbally specify the 
stickers or their location, thus encouraging the use of gestures and limiting the amount of verbal 
output required for the task.  The results of piloting in Study 1 found that for the younger 2-year-
olds, verbalizations were less frequent and less intelligible.  Study 2 involved the experimenter 
hiding a sticker, which could be used to complete a play scene, in one of two identical boxes 
with the caregiver’s eyes opened or closed.  Children who were unresponsive were prompted in 
the same manner as they were for the first task. The overall results of the studies showed that 
when the adults were unaware of the location of an object, there were significant increases in 
gestures, eye gaze, and verbalizations including the object’s name and location, suggesting that 
the children did tailor their requests by taking into account the mental states of the adults.  
In Study 2 with the younger two-year-olds, other gestures, which were less specific than 
points in indicating location, occurred at a higher percentage on open-eye trials.  In contrast, 
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three-point gaze shifts (e.g., gaze directed to the caregiver, then to an object, then back to the 
caregiver) occurred more frequently during closed-eye trials.  When the total combined amount 
of information on location to the caregivers (i.e., total gestures and gaze) was examined, it was 
found that a greater percentage of the children gave more location information on closed-eye 
trials.  These results in combination suggest that younger two-year-olds demonstrated that they 
do construct a model of another’s point of view.  These findings also suggest that reducing the 
linguistic and memory load may allow for a more sensitive measure of whether toddlers or 
children with ASD can construct a model of another’s point of view. 
!
The Current Study 
The current study expanded upon O’Neill’s (1996) paradigm by presenting a personally 
relevant and familiar social situation to two- and three-year-old children with TD.  Traditional 
false-belief tasks show an abrupt appearance of ToM at 4 years of age in children with TD, and, 
thus, it is of interest to examine the two years leading up to the apparent abrupt appearance.  In 
addition, the current study included two and three-year olds with ASD to determine whether their 
spontaneous actions were comparable to that of children with TD.  A task similar to the one in 
Study 2 of O’Neill (1996) was used. In contrast to O’Neill’s experiment, the current study’s task 
does not introduce new names of individuals or objects, and thus minimizes memory load.  The 
individuals involved in the current study’s activity were the child, caregiver, and clinician (who 
did not need to be known by name).  The proposed task also did not require naming on demand, 
or require the children to retain information about what happened at an early time in the session 
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or indicate this information in response to a wh- question containing temporal-sequential 
concepts.  Overall the current task involved fewer verbal instructions and required less verbal 
output than the typically-used FBT, thus reducing the verbal and cognitive demands required to 
successfully perform the task.  The task was more ecologically valid than most FBTs in that it 
required the child to engage in a scenario (i.e., requesting a toy from caregiver) that is generally 
familiar, in contrast to the artificial contexts that are often used during FBTs.   
 It was hypothesized that the ASD group would produce fewer communicative acts across 
both conditions (i.e., closed and open eye) and tailor those communicative acts less frequently to 
the caregiver’s knowledge than the TD group.  It was believed that the reduced cognitive 
demands of the task, however, had a greater potential to show whether children with ASD 
consider the internal states of others to any degree and whether there would be a differences in 
performance within the ASD group based on language skills.  
  
Research Questions 
With reduced cognitive and linguistic demands, this study’s task gave a better indication 
of whether toddlers with ASD have precursors of ToM.  To date, there has not been examination 
of this population using a simple ToM task that has minimal linguistic and memory requirements.   
Social interaction appears to be essential to the development of ToM (Harris, 1999; Seigel, 1998; 
Smith, 1996).  In the current study, we examined the use of gestures (point and reaching) and 
gaze/gesture combinations. These means of communication in young children support the 
development of ToM.  Specific research questions included: 
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1.  When using an assessment task with a low language and memory load, do 
preschoolers with autism and children with typical development demonstrate precursor 
skills such as gestures and gaze that will allow us to infer the development of theory of 
mind? 
!
      I hypothesized that preschoolers with TD would demonstrate more evidence of ToM than 
preschoolers with ASD.  Specifically, when presented with a familiar scenario (i.e., requesting 
objects from a caregiver), the group with TD will gesture (point or reach), use gaze and gesture-
gaze combinations (looks to initiate exchange + gesture, gesture + 3-point gaze shifts more 
frequently across conditions (i.e., caregiver with closed eyes or opened eyes), as compared with 
the ASD group. 
!
2. Does manipulating caregivers’ knowledge state affect children’s communicative 
behavior in a way that suggests the presence of emerging theory of mind? 
!
 I predicted that children with TD would show differential performance on the closed 
versus open-eye trials because they can use eye-gaze information to infer caretaker knowledge. I 
predicted that the TD group will use more gestures, gaze and gesture-gaze combinations during 
the closed (vs. open eye) condition than children with ASD.  The children with ASD were 
expected to tailor their communication bids less that the TD group across trials as they would 
likely experience more barriers to communication (e.g. self-stimulatory behaviors such as 
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flapping hands) in exchanges with their caregivers. During the closed-eye tasks, the ASD group 
was also expected to alter their communicative bids in response to their caregivers knowledge 
state, but again at a less frequent rate than the TD group, due to the atypical engagement patterns, 
reduced joint attention and use of eye gaze that is expected for the ASD group during social 
exchanges.  Both the ASD and the TD groups were expected to use more gestures (points and 
reaches), gaze and gesture-gaze combinations (looks to initiate exchange + gesture, gesture + 3-
point gaze shifts) during the closed eye (vs. open eye) condition. 
3. When preschoolers overtly demonstrate awareness of their caregivers (i.e., looks at 
caregiver) during task instructions, do they subsequently use more complex 
communicative bids to demonstrate the early development of theory of mind.  
  
 The ASD group was expected to be aware of their caregivers and to attempt to express 
their needs to their caregivers in a primarily nonverbal manner, which is not a typical 
performance expectation for their chronological age.  Although children with ASD may do so 
more subtly than their typically developing peers, they are capable of demonstrating awareness 
of their caregiver’s presence through means likes gaze and gesture (Kasari, Gulsrud, Wong, 
Kwon, & Locke, 2010).  Both groups of participants’ attention to their caregivers following 
examiner instructions was expected to correlate with the number of gesture and gesture-gaze 
combinations participants used in the closed-eye condition.  In other words, the ASD and TD 
participants who looked at their caregivers during the instructions for the majority of all trials 
would use more gesture, gaze and gesture-gaze combination during the closed-eye condition than 
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the ASD and TD participants who looked at their caregiver during instructions less frequently 
across trials. 
 Results from the present study will help researchers and clinicians understand the 
development of the theory of mind and the precursors to it.  This study provides important 
information regarding development patterns that may affect children with ASD’s overall social 
cognition and social communication.  Gaining a more complete understanding of theory of mind 














Chapter 2: Methodology 
Participants 
Twenty children participated in this study ranging in age from 27-44 months (M=34, 
SD=5.67). Half of the preschoolers were diagnosed with autism (n=10) and the other half (n=10) 
served as typically developing controls.  The children were administered the Mullen Scales of 
Early Learning (Mullen, 1995) to determine their eligibility to participate in this study.   All 
participants were be required to achieve a standard score of 40 or above on the average of the 
nonverbal subtests (i.e., Visual Reception and Fine Motor divided by two) of the Mullen.  The 
Mullen is a standardized, normed, developmental assessment of nonverbal and verbal IQ for 
children six years of age and under.  It was also used to assess general receptive and expressive 
language abilities of participants for descriptive purposes. While both groups of participants had 
average or better cognitive skills (i.e., their overall average of both their Visual Reception scores 
and Fine Motor subtest scores were 40 or greater), the two groups differed significantly in 
cognitive ability on nonverbal tasks and language skills. Two tailed t-tests were conducted for 
Visual Reception (p=.016), Fine Motor (FM, p=.045),  Average of Nonverbal Tasks (VR plus 
FM, p=.005), Receptive Language (p=001) and Expressive Language (p=.003).   Two-tailed t-
tests revealed no significant differences between groups for age (p=.880) and sex (male/female) 
(p=1).  
 Recruitment Participants were recruited through flyers that were distributed through 
autism online groups, parent mailing list servers, university email lists, daycare centers, 
preschools and community boards in the New York City boroughs.  Parents were asked 
 21
preliminary questions via phone to determine whether their child might qualify for the study.  
Participants were reimbursed for their time through a cash stipend, language and cognitive 
testing, a hearing screening, upon request, a written summary of their child’s testing results.  All 
children assented to participate in the experimental study and all parents gave informed consent 
for their children to participate. Caregivers also completed a Language, Education and Therapy 
Background Questionnaire during their visit.   
 All participants were required to pass a pure-tone hearing screening presented at 20 dB 
HL for frequencies of 250, 1000, 2000, and 4000 Hz.   Visual reinforcement audiometry (VRA) 
was used for all but three participants who were able to tolerate the testing using ear phones.  
During VRA, an auditory stimulus was presented initially in soundfield simultaneously with a 
light-up toy being activated within a closed case to the left or right of the sound booth out of the 
child’s reach.  When the children showed that they associated the sound with the reinforcement 
by turning to look when the sound was presented and the toy was not activated, they were 
considered to be conditioned to the task. Then the intensity level of the sound stimulus was 
reduced until a minimum response level was obtained. 
   Participants with ASD Half of the participants completing this study were identified as 
preschoolers with a diagnosis of ASD from a written report from a pediatric psychologist.  The 
experimenter was able to review the finding and confirm that the ASD diagnosis was given to all 
participants in the ASD group. Parents/caretakers of participants with ASD reported that the child 
had no other neurological disorders, history of seizures, use of any medications that could affect 
cognition and communication or any uncorrected sensory impairments (e.g., hearing loss).  As 
 22
the current study was designed to minimize the amount of linguistic demand in a ToM task by 
analyzing gestures & gaze, both verbal & minimally verbal participants with ASD were included.  
Standard scores from the Mullen Scales of Early Learning ranged from 37-65 for Visual 
Reception (M= 47.2, SD=10.16), from 39-45 for Fine Motor (M= 41.8, SD=1.55), from 20-62 for 
Receptive Language (M=36.4, SD=13.01) and from 20-59 Expressive Language (M=39.1, 
SD=15.42). See Table 1 below.  The following descriptive categories are associated with test 
performance on the Mullen.  T-scores falling in the range of 40-60 are considered in the 
“average” range (M=50, SD=10).  Scores of 20-30 are in the “very low” range.  Scores of 30-40 
are in the “below average” range. Scores 60-70 are in the “above average” range and scores of 
70-80 are in the “very high” range. 
Control participants Half of the children enrolled in this study served as typically 
developing controls.  These control participants were matched to the children with autism based 
on sex (male/female) and cognitive ability on nonverbal tasks on the Mullen.  This group had no 
history of neurological disorders or seizures, no current use of any medications that could affect 
cognition and communication or any uncorrected sensory impairments (e.g., hearing loss). In 
addition, all TD participants had no history of speech and language delay/disorder or treatment or 
familial history of ASD.  All typically-developing controls scored within normal limits (within 
one standard deviation (SD) from the mean (M) on the Visual Reception and the Expressive 
Language subtests of the Mullen.  Standard scores from the Mullen Scales of Early Learning 
ranged from 43-80 for Visual Reception (M=61.1, SD=12.86), from 38-67 for Fine Motor 
(M=49.1, SD=9.88), from 35-74 for Receptive Language (M=57.7, SD=12.29) and from 48-68 
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for Expressive Language (M=59.1, SD= 7.59).  One participant from the TD group received a 
borderline score (t-score=35) on the Receptive Language subtest. And two participants received 
borderline scores (t-scores= 38 and 39) on the Fine Motor subtest of the Mullen, but achieved an 
average nonverbal score within one standard deviation below the mean. See Table 1. 
Table 1. Participant Information 
Note: Visual Reception, Fine Motor, Receptive Language and Expressive Language are all 
subtest of the Mullen Scales of Early Learning. Scores of 40-60 are in the “average” range 
(group M=50, SD=10) 
aVisual Reception subtest standard score 
bFine Motor subtest standard score  
cReceptive Language subtest standard score 
dExpressive Language subtest standard score  








S10 ASD M 28 54 41 48 59
S11 ASD F 28 59 45 62 59
S12 ASD M 28 56 41 42 53
S13 ASD M 35 40 42 35 43
S14 ASD F 27 41 41 39 46
S15 ASD M 31 65 42 38 29
S16 ASD M 38 40 42 20 20
S17 ASD M 41 40 39 20 23
S18 ASD M 38 37 42 24 20
S19 ASD M 44 40 43 36 39
Mean 33.8 47.2 41.8 36.4 39.1
SD 6.21 10.16 1.55 13.01 15.42
L10 TD F 27 50 38 45 56
L12 TD M 38 63 39 66 64
L13 TD M 36 67 45 35 49
L14 TD M 37 63 67 53 52
L15 TD M 35 63 52 64 65
L16 TD M 33 80 42 54 68
L17 TD M 25 43 40 69 63
L18 TD M 40 80 56 74 68
L19 TD F 30 57 60 67 58
L20 TD M 41 45 52 50 48
Mean 34.2 61.1 49.1 57.7 59.1
SD 5.39 12.85 9.88 12.29 7.59
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Materials and stimuli  
  For the current study, identical containers were used to minimize the chance that verbal 
children would use verbalizations regarding the attributes of the container to differentiate the 
location, rather than gestures.  In O’Neill’s (1996) Study 2, a picture of a farmyard scene and 
stickers were used as temptations.  The current study used nine wind-up animal toys (of the same 
general size, with similar sounds, which do different, singular movement (walking, flipping, see 
Figure 1, and Appendix B.) to reduce the possibility of variability of interest in the objects 
between the subject groups.  This choice was influenced by toy selections from the 
Communication and Symbolic Behavior Scales (CSBS) test, which is used to assess 
communicative, social, and play abilities in young children with ASD and TD children 
(Wetherby & Prizant, 1993).   The CSBS utilizes wind-up toys that have been shown to be of 
high interest to children with ASD who often have restricted interests or engage in repetitive 
behavior.  When used in the CSBS, these toys tempted children to the point that they would 
spontaneously communicative and play possibly related to the repeated pattern of multi-sensory 
input (e.g., auditory, visual) that the toys give. 
A sign was posted to the left of the table asking the caregiver to “Please say as little as 
possible and keep a neutral expression during closed/covered and open eye tasks."  The camera 





 The experimental sessions generally took between 10-13 minutes for both groups.  There 
was one participant from the TD group who completed the task in 9 minutes and one participant 
from the ASD group who took 19 minutes to complete the task. Each trial took between 40-90 
seconds and varied based on each child’s responsiveness. 
 The participant were seated at a table with the experimenter sitting 90 degrees to the right 
and the caregiver sitting 90 degrees to the left for this study’s experimental task (See Appendix 
C).  One video camera was set up ahead and out of reach at an angle where the child’s gaze and 
gestures are recorded.  An additional video camera was placed to capture the movements of the 
caregiver. 
 Introduction to the containers   The children were shown a non-transparent container, 
then a fixed group of three toys (i.e., the elephant, the bear, and the lion) from an opaque cup, 
and how the toys work (See Figure 1).  The experimenter remained nonverbal and quickly 
“poured” one toy from the cup into the container, so that the child got a fleeting visual of the 
item (reducing the chance that they would ask for it by name if verbal) and the auditory feedback 
from the sound of the toy falling into the container.  Then the experimenter shook the container 
slightly to further confirm that a toy was inside, and placed it on the shelf on either the right or 
the left of the empty container.  Then the children were told that they could play with it and that 
their caregiver would be their “helper” and get the toy for them. The experiment would state 
“You can play. Daddy/mommy will help you get it”.  If the children did not spontaneously 
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request (within 1-2 s), they were given the prompt “Tell caregiver “name” what to do. 
!!
Once the children responded, the caregivers retrieved the toy.  Caregivers were urged to avoid 
asking questions for clarification, such as “You want this one?”  If the child did not respond, the 
experimenter prompted the caregivers to get the toy from the shelf, while telling the children that 
this was how the adult could help them get the toy.  
!
 Familiarization trials    Four familiarization trials were used to acquaint the children with 
the task. The same procedure as outlined above was followed for the first three familiarization 
trials with one alteration: one container only was placed on the table instead, in front of the 
!
! ! !  
!
                                                                                                Nasir, you can play. !
                                                                                              Daddy will help you get it. !
Figure 1. Materials and procedures for the introduction of the containers portion of the 
alternative theory of mind experimental task. The left image shows the 
container, the middle image shows three of the toys and the right image 
illustrates “pouring the toy into the container”. 
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children out of reach at approximately a distance of 3 feet.  The elephant, the bear, and the lion 
toys were used for these trials. A final familiarization trial was presented after the two identical 
containers were set up again for the experimental trials.  This final familiarization trial followed 
the same script as used for the experimental trials. For the final familiarization trial and the six 
experimental trials, one toy was randomly selected for use on each trial from the complete set of 
7 toys (i.e., bear, elephant, lion, frog, tiger, panda, and dog). This final familiarization trial was 
always an open-eye trial to give the child (and caregiver) an additional opportunity to see what 
the experimental trials will involve. This procedure demonstrated to the child that caregivers 
could help retrieve the toys, even in the case that the child is non-verbal. Figure 2 displays the 




 Experimental trials   The familiarization trials were followed by six experimental trials in 
which the caregivers had their eyes open or closed/covered on alternating trials (with 3 trials 
each for each condition).  Half of each participant group started with an open eye trial.  The 
procedure followed the protocol initially outlined in the procedures section, but with the 
experimenter beginning the trial by indicating that the caregivers’ eyes would be open or closed 
(i.e., "This time, caregiver’s “name” has open/closed eyes. S/he can/'t see it.").  See Figure 2.  
!
 3 Familiarization   +  1 Final Familiarization and  
                                    6 Experimental Trials !
   !   !  
                                            This time, daddy has open/closed eyes. 
                                            He can/‘t see it. 
                                            Daddy, open your eyes. 
                                            Nasir, you can play with it. 
                                            Daddy will help you get it. !
  (Parents eyes                     
   open (o) or closed (c)       o o c o  c o c         o o c o c  o c        o c o c  o c o      o c o c  o c o 
   
                                            F R L L R L R     F L R R L R L     F R L L R L R     F L R R L R L !
Figure 2. Photograph of materials and procedures for the familiarization and experimental trials of 
the alternative theory of mind experimental task. 
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Then caregivers were asked to open/uncover their eyes, if applicable.  Caregivers were asked to 
use their hands to cover their eyes in order to increase the likelihood that the child was aware of 
their closed eyes.   Prompting was done as necessary as previously outlined.  The first four 
experimental trials were counterbalanced for the direction of the container where the toy was 
located (i.e., left (L) or right (R) - RLLR and LRRL) and were followed by two final trials in 
fixed order.  This resulted in a RLLRLR or LRRLRL presentation order.  
!
Data Analysis 
The experimental portion of each participant’s visit was audio and video recorded.  The 
video recordings were coded by the experimenter and a research assistant, who was blind to the 
clinical status of the participants. The research assistant was enrolled in a high school specialized 
program for research in behavioral sciences. For each trail, the participant’s first communication 
bid following the experimenter’s instructions was coded.  If a response was given, the response 
was coded to indicate if it included gaze (G), gesture(s) (J) or both a combination of gaze and 
gesture(s) (JG).  The first communicative bid following the experimenter’s instruction was 
coded.  If a participant did not produce any communication bids following the experimenter’s 
instructions, a “no response” (NR) code was given.  Verbalizations were not coded due to the 
expected discrepancy between the ASD and TD groups’ expressive language skills.  Intra-rater 
reliability for 30% of the trials was calculated.  Cohen's κ was calculated to determine if there 
was agreement between the two coder’s judgments on whether 20 participants produced no 
response or a communication bid with a gaze, a gesture or a gesture-gaze combination.  There 
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was substantial agreement between the two coder’s judgments, κ = .729 (95% CI, .364 to 1),       
p < .05 (Landis & Koch, 1977).  Following the coding of each participant, the research assistant 
was asked to judge whether or not the participant had ASD using a 4-point scale (i.e., 1- Yes (no 
doubt), 2- Yes (but not sure), 3- No (but not sure), and 4- No (no doubt).  The research assistant 
coded 10 out of 10 participants with ASD as having an autism diagnosis and 9 out of 10 
participants with typical development (TD) as not having autism. 
Statistical hypothesis tests for equality of variance, for independence and to compare 
population means, and for looking at dependence relationships between scores were used to 
examine the participants’ communication bids following the examiner’s instructions.  An F-test 
was conducted to see if the spread of overall communicative bids differed significantly between 
groups.  T-tests, chi-square, and analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests highlighted any differences 
in the number of communication acts produced by the TD group as compared to the ASD group 
across conditions in terms of usage of gestures, gaze and gesture-gaze combinations.  Any 
differences in the mean number of gestures, looks and usage of gesture-gaze combinations by the 
ASD group and TD group in the open and closed conditions was also examined using t-tests and 
chi-squared tests.   Correlation and chi-squared tests were used to examine whether the number 
of communicative bids from the group of ASD participants who looked at their caregivers during 
the instructions for 3 or less of the trials differed from the number of bids from the group of 
participants who looked at their caregivers for 4 or more of the trials in terms of gesture, gaze 
and gesture-gaze combinations usage.  The latter group included both ASD and TD participants. 
!
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Chapter 3: Results 
Data analysis of the communication bids (gestures, gaze and gesture-gaze combinations) 
was performed.  The first set of analyses examined group differences in all six trials.  Second, 
behavior for each group in the three closed-eye versus the three open-eye conditions was 
inspected.  Finally, all participants were separated into two subsets based on the frequency at 
which they looked at their caregiver following the examiner’s instructions and their use of the 
various communication bid types was examined. 
Variability of communication bids and frequency of responses 
Table 2 shows the number of communicative acts in each category for each child as well 
as the means and standard deviations for each group. All ASD (10 out of 10) and TD (10 out of 
10) participants produced a communication bid following the experimenter’s instructions on at 
least 2 out of the 6 trials. There was no significant difference in the variance between the ASD 
group (M=0.1, SD=0.3) and the TD group (M=0.1, SD=0.3) for gesture without gaze (F(1, 9)= 1,  
p=0.50), gaze without gesture (F(1, 9)=0.531,  p=.180, ASD M=2.3, SD=1.9, TD M=2.4, 
SD=2.6) or a combination of gesture and gaze (F(1, 9)=0.382,  p=.084, ASD M=1.8, SD=1.5, 





Table 2. Participant groups average use of communication bids
S10-S20= ASD Group, L10-L19= TD Group
 
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  Table 3.  Comparison of variance of scores for gesture (without gaze) 
communication bids in ASD and TD groups across trials
Variable 1=ASD Group Bid Opportunities, N=10, Variable 2=TD 
Group Bid Opportunities, N=10
  Table 4. V Comparison of variance of scores for gaze (without 
gesture) communication bids in ASD and TD groups across trials
Variable 1=ASD Group Bid Opportunities, N=10, Variable 2=TD 





Types of communication bids used across trials 
The participants with TD used more gesture-gaze combinations (M= 3.5, SD=2.5) to 
communicate with the adults (their caregiver or the examiner) during both the open-eye and 
closed-eye tasks than the ASD group (M=1.8, SD=1.5).  See Table 2.  A chi-square test showed 
that this was significant, χ2 (1, N=20), p=.002, Cohen’s d= 1.22.  The children with ASD used a 
similar number of communication bids that were gaze without gesture (M=2.3, SD=1.9) in 
comparison with the TD group (M=2.4, SD=2.6). A t-test confirmed that there was no significant 
difference between participant groups’ use of gaze without gestures (t =2.262; p=.922).  Again, 
only two of the twenty children, one in each group, used gesture without gaze, showing little 
  Table 5. Comparison of variance of scores for combined gesture and 
gaze communication bids in ASD and TD groups across trials




variability, and thus, a t-test was inappropriate.  See Table 6. Therefore, additional statistics were 
not performed for this category.  Overall the participants in the ASD group demonstrated more 
“no responses” (M=1.8, SD=1.5) following experimenter instructions than the 10 out of 10 
children in the TD group who responded on all six trials.  In contrast, only 3 of the 10 ASD 
participants responded on all trials. The response rate was significantly different between groups, 
χ2 (1, N=20)=3.84, p=.001, Cohen’s d=2.2. In examining the pattern in greater detail, of the 
seven children who failed to respond on some trials, one responded on 5/6 trials, three responded 
on 4/6 trials, one responded on 3/6 trials and two on 2/6 trials.    
Communication bids for closed versus open-eye conditions  
 Table 7 shows total communicative bids for the ASD and TD groups across trials and the 
number of communication bids each group presented during the separate open and closed-eye 
trials.  The data were collapsed to examine whether there were significant differences in closed 
and open-eye trials regardless of group membership. The children showed no significant 
differences in communicative acts for open-eye (M=1.25, SD=1.25) versus closed trials (M=1.10, 
SD=1.25, t =2.093, p =0.706)  for gaze without gesture.  Their use of gesture and gaze 
combinations on open-eye trials (M=1.25, SD=1.16) versus closed-eye trials (M=1.40, SD=1.19), 
Table 6. Total Number of Communication Bids by Group Across Trials
ASD= Participants with ASD, TD= Participants with TD
 
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t = 2.093, p = 0.688) was also not significantly different.  Gestures without gaze (open and 
closed-eye trials, M=0.05, SD=0.22) could not be evaluated further because too few children 
produced gestures alone.  A chi-square test confirmed that there was a significant difference in 
the number of children in each group who used no response across trials (open and closed-eye 
trials, M=0.45, SD=0.76, χ2 (1, N=20), p=.003, Cohen’s d= 1.8). 
!
!
Table 7. Frequency of Communicative Bids for Open and Closed-Eye Trials and Total 
Communicative Acts !
Participant            Overall                                      Open                                                     Closed
!
O= No Response, J= Gesture only,  G= Gaze only, and JG= Gesture-Gaze combinations 
!
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Communication bids within each group comparing conditions 
 Table 8 shows the communicative bids for open and closed trials with means and 
standard deviations listed by group. When looking at each group’s performance on the each eye 
condition, the children with ASD showed no significant differences in communicative acts 
between open and closed trials for gaze without gesture (open M=1.10, SD=1.10, closed M=1.20, 
SD=1.32), t =2.262, p =0.104) or gesture and gaze combined (open M=0.90, SD=0.74, closed 
M=0.90, SD=0.99), t =2.262, p =0.279). No significant differences were observed for the TD 
group when comparing open (M=1.40, SD=1.43) and closed trials (M=1, SD=1.25) for gaze 
without gesture (t =2.262, p =0.840).  Comparison of gesture-gaze combinations on open 
(M=1.60, SD=1.43) and closed (M=1.90, SD=1.20) trials was also not statistically significant (t 
=2.262, p =1).  Gesture without gaze could not be evaluated due to the limited number of 
participants who produced this type of communication bid.  The ASD group (M=0.90, SD=0.88) 
had the same average number of non-responses in the open versus closed conditions, while the 
TD has no instances of non-response. 
!
Communication bids within each condition comparing groups   
A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tested the number of gesture plus gaze 
combinations used by children with ASD or with TD whose caregivers had their eyes opened or 
closed during the examiner’s instructions. There was a significant main effect for participant 
 38
group (F(1, 36) = 5.77, p =0.021, Cohen’s d=-.32).  See Table 9.  Children with TD used a 
significantly higher number of gesture and gaze combinations. The TD group used more gesture-
gaze combinations (M=1.90, SD =1.20 ) than the ASD group (M=0.90, SD =0.99) during the 
closed-eye and the open-eye condition (TDM=1.60, SD =1.43, ASDM=0.90, SD =0.74). See 
Table 5. The main effect of eye condition was non-significant, F(1, 36) = 0.180, p=.674). The 
interaction effect was non-significant, F(1, 36) = 0.180, p=.674) indicating that the use of 
gesture and gaze combinations did not differ in the groups based on eye condition.  A two-way 
ANOVA was also conducted to test the how often of gaze (without gesture) was used in both 
groups in either condition. The main effects of group, F(1, 36) = 0.015, p=.902) and eye 
condition, F(1, 36) = 0.138, p=.713), as well as the interaction effect, F(1, 36) = 0.382, p=.540), 
were non-significant.  There was no significant difference between groups for gaze without 
gesture on closed-eye trials (ASD M=1.20, SD = 1.19, TD M=1.10, SD = 1.42). The ASD group 
also produced no response on average more frequently (M=0.90) during the closed-eye trials 
than the TD group who responded on all trials.  This difference was found to be statistically 
significant, χ2 (1, N=20)=3.84, p=0. Gestures without gaze  (M=0.10, SD=0.32) could not be 
evaluated because only 1 child in the TLD group produced communicative acts in this category.  
On the open-eye trials, the ASD group also produced no response on average more frequently 
(M=0.90) than the TD group who responded on all trials.  This difference was found to be 
statistically significant  χ2 (1, N=20)=3.84, p=0.025, Cohen d=1.15.   Gesture without gaze could 





Table 8. Frequency of Communicative Bids for Open and Closed-Eye Trials for Group with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Group with Typical Development (TD)
Communication bids are coded as: O= No response, J= Gesture without gaze, G=Gaze 




Table 9. Frequency of Gesture and Gaze Combinations for Open and Closed-Eye Trials for 
Group with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Group with Typical Development (TD)
Sample= Participant Group, Columns= Eye Condition
 
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Communication Bids Related to Child Gaze Directed at Caregiver   
Performance in the closed-eye condition was also examined while considering whether 
the children looked at their caregiver to see that the caregiver’s eyes were closed during the 
examiner’s instructions.  Given the distribution of the data,  dividing the participants into two 
subsets of those who looked at their caregiver on more than half of the trials and those who 
looked at their caregivers on 3 or less of the 6 trials seemed reasonable, as three (S12, S16 and 
S19) of the total 20 study participants failed to look at their caregiver following examiner 
instructions in 3 or more of the experimental trials.  See Table 10.  And all three participants 
were from the ASD group.  These three participants did not use gestures without gaze which was 
similar to the pattern displayed by the majority of their peers. Only two of the total study’s 
participants used gesture without gaze  (M=.05, SD=.24) on a single occasion. Interestingly, the 
three participants who looked at their caregiver during examiner instructions on 3 or less of the 
trials, used gaze without gesture more frequently (M=2, SD=1.73) as compared to their peers 
(M=.94, SD=1.14) during the closed-eye trials.  See Figure 3.  They similarly used gaze without 
gesture more frequently across trials (M=4.33, SD=2.08) as compared to their 17 peers (M=2, 
SD=2.09) and during the open-eye trials (M=2.33, SD=0.58) as compared to their 17 peers 
(M=1.06, SD=1.25).  When scores across participant groups for gaze without gesture were 
ranked, all three of these participants ranked in the top 10 (of 20) highest scores while 2 of them 
ranked in the top 5 (of 20) highest scores a position that was shared only with participants from 
the TD group. When scores for the ASD group were examined separately, the same 2 participants 
received the highest scores of 5 and 6.  As compared with the other ASD participant (Subject 
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S16) who looked at their caregivers during instructions for 3 or fewer trials, these 2 participants 
(Subjects S12 and S16) had higher average receptive language skills. See Table 1.  
!
The performance of these three participants who looked at their caregiver following 
examiner instructions on fewer than 3 of the experimental trials was also compared to that of the 
other participants in their ASD group who looked at their caregivers following instructions on 
!




more than 3 of the trials. See Table 10. These three participants used gaze without gesture more 
frequently (M=4.33, SD=2.08) across trials than their peers within the ASD group (M=1.43, 
SD=0.98).  They also used gaze without gesture more frequently (M=2, SD=1.73) as compared to 
their peers in the ASD group with (M=0.86, SD=1.07) during the closed-eye trials.   See Figure 
4.  And they similarly used more gaze without gesture (M=2.33, SD=0.58) in the open-eye trials 
as compared to their peers with ASD (M=0.57, SD=0.79).  In contrast, these three participants 
used gesture-gaze combinations less frequently (M=.67, SD=1.15) than all 17 of their peers 
(M=1.53, SD=1.18) and their 7 peers from the ASD group (M=1, SD=1) in the closed eye trials.  
A similar pattern of less frequent use of gesture and gaze combinations was also seen in the open 



















Table 10. Communication Bids for Participants by the Percentage of Trials in which 
Participants Looked at Their Caregivers
 
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The results of this study show that overall the children with ASD responded less 
frequently.  There was no significant difference in the number of basic communication bids each 
group used according to type (i.e, gesture without gaze, gaze without gesture).  A difference in 
group performance was significant when comparing the participant groups’ use of more complex 
communication bids (i.e., gesture and gaze combinations).  There was also no significant 
difference in the number of communication bids used between conditions (i.e, closed-eye and 
open-eye) when the responses of children with ASD and children with TD were examined 
together or in their separate groups.  The groups differed significantly in their non-responses in 
both the open and closed-eye conditions.  Finally, a subset of three participants with ASD who 
looked at their caregiver on 3 or fewer of the trials during the experimenter’s instructions showed 
different performance from the remaining participants in the study.  The three participants used 
gaze without gesture more frequently than all their peers and than their peers with ASD and 
fewer gesture-gaze combinations when compared with their remaining ASD peers and the total 
remaining participants from both groups. 
a  Participants with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) who looked at their caregivers during     
    experimenter instructions for less than 50% of trials. 
b  Participants with ASD and typical development (TD) who looked at their caregivers during  
    experimenter instructions for more than 50% of trials.  
c  Mean scores for ASD participants who looked at their caregivers during experimenter 
instructions  
   for more than 50% of trials. 
d  Associated standard deviations for 
e Mean scores for ASD and TD participants who looked at their caregivers during 
experimenter  
   instructions for more than 50% of trials.  
f  Associated standard deviations for 
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Correlational analyses were used to explore the relationship between the participants’ use 
of gaze during the experimenter’s instructions and their use of gaze and gesture-gaze 
combinations to get their needs met.  It was believed that those children who attended to their 
caregivers more during instructions would have greater awareness of their caregivers’ knowledge 
state and subsequently use gaze without gesture and complex communication bids (i.e., gesture-
gaze combinations) more frequently during the closed-eye trials.  Percentage of trials that all 
participants looked at their caregivers during the experimenter’s instructions and how frequently 
participants used gaze (without gesture) was negatively correlated with a medium effect size, 
Pearson’s r(20)= -.30, p>.05, (Cohen, 1988).  See Table 11. As the percentage of trials in which 
the participant looked at their caregiver during instructions went up, their use of gaze without 
gesture reduced. 
A correlational analysis was also used to explore the relationship between the 
participants’ use of gaze during the experimenter’s instructions and their use of gaze and gesture-
Table 11. Relationship Between the Percentage of Trials ASD and TD Groups Looked At 
Their Caregivers During Experimenter Instructions and Their Use of Gaze Without Gesture 
Across Trials  
 
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gaze combinations to get their needs met.  It was believed that those children who attended to 
their caregivers more during instructions would have a greater awareness of their caregivers’ 
knowledge state and subsequently use more complex communication bids (i.e., gesture-gaze 
combinations) during the closed-eye trials. The two variables were positively correlated with a 
medium effect size, Pearson’s r(20)= .39, p>.05.  See Table 12.  As the percentage of looking at 
caregivers during instructions increased, the use of gesture-gaze combinations  increased  in both 
subsets of participants, but there was not a statistically significant relationship between gaze at 
caregivers during instructions and use of gaze without gesture or gesture-gaze combinations.  
Correlational analyses were used to explore the relationship between the participants’ use 
of gaze during the experimenter’s instructions and their nonverbal abilities and languages skills 
as measured by the Mullen. The percentage of trials that the participants looked at their 
caregivers during instructions was positively correlated with a medium effect size to both 
nonverbal subtests, Visual Reception (Pearson’s r(20)= .41, p>.05) and Fine Motor (Pearson’s 
r(20)= .43, p>.05).  See Table 13.  The percentage of trials that the participants looked at their 
caregivers during instructions was positively correlated with a large effect size to both language 
Table 12. Relationship Between the Percentage of Trials ASD and TD Groups Looked At 
Their Caregivers During Experimenter Instructions and Their Use of Gaze Without Gesture 
Across Trials  !
 
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subtest, Receptive Language (Pearson’s r(20)= .76, p>.05) and Expressive Language (Pearson’s 
r(20)= .66, p>.05).  See Table 13.  The most notable relationship was between percentage of 




Table 13. Relationship Between the Percentage of Trials ASD and TD Groups Looked At 
Their Caregivers During Experimenter Instructions and Their Performance on the Mullen 
Scales of Early Learning Subtests 
!  








Figure 5.  Correlation between Mullen Scales of Early Learning Subtest Scores and 
Participants Gaze at Caregivers During Instructions !
!  !
VR=Visual Reception subtest, FM=Fine Motor subtest, RL=Receptive Language subtest, 
EL=Expressive Language subtest
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Chapter 4: Discussion  
 This study examined the communication bids that preschoolers with and without autism 
used with their caregivers in a context where their caregivers’ knowledge of their surroundings 
fluctuated.  Specifically, the types and frequency of communication bids was analyzed.  Three 
research questions were examined.  First, I examined if the 2 and 3 year olds were successful in  
using communication strategies (i.e., gaze, gesture, and gesture/gaze combined) to communicate 
with their caregivers who had fluctuating knowledge about their surroundings during an 
assessment task that had a low language and memory load. I found that he children with TD used 
more communication acts more frequently and used communication of greater complexity (i.e., 
gesture and gaze combinations) to get their needs met across conditions (i.e., open and closed-
eye tasks). Second, I examined whether children would adjust their communication acts as their 
caregiver’s knowledge state was manipulated.  The simple play task used in this study did not 
explicitly reveal that preschoolers with and without autism notably altered their communication 
behaviors in response to their caregivers’ knowledge state.  Finally,  I examined whether an 
observed awareness of caregiver’s knowledge state (i.e., looks at face during examiner’s 
instructions about the play task) would lead to use of communication bids of increasing 
complexity by the children.  While an increase in complexity of communication bids was not 
associated with a fluctuation in caregiver’s knowledge state, a subset of ASD participants, who 
looked less frequently at their caregivers during instructions, did use gaze (without gesture) more 
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frequently  and gesture-gaze combinations less frequently than their peers overall.  Below the 
findings will be discussed in greater detail. 
  
Communication Bids Across Conditions Comparing Groups 
 The ASD group used fewer gesture-gaze combinations across trials as compared with the 
TD group, as predicted.   Our findings are consistent with the work of Landry and Loveland 
(1989) that children with ASD may direct attention less frequently than their typically 
developing peers in spontaneous interactions.  The finding that the children with TD used more 
gesture-gaze combinations than the ASD group across conditions was not surprising.  Typically 
developing children are expected to use a combination of communication strategies to get their 
needs met (Greenfield & Smith, 1976). In addition, the higher receptive and expressive language 
scores demonstrated by the TD group would suggest that they would be more skilled at using a 
combination of communication acts to navigate socially.  Hale & Tager-Flusberg (2003) added 
support to other studies that suggest that the development of theory mind is highly associated 
with the development of language (de Villiers & Pryers, 1997; Tager-Flusberg 1997, 2000).  
Specifically, the ability to understand syntax (i.e., sentential complements) or the semantic 
knowledge that verbs symbolize mental states reportedly puts children in a better position to 
demonstrate theory of mind skills. 
 Astington & Jenkins (1999) suggest that early language abilities predict later ToM 
abilities, while early ToM abilities do not predict later expressive language abilities.  If this is 
argument is true and the current task was linguistically loaded, perhaps we may have seen better 
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performance by the TD group given their more developed linguistic skills set.  We were 
measuring precursors to ToM in real-time, so the influence of age appropriate language 
performance of the TD group would not be expected to be easily reflected in current ToM 
performance, but would be expected to be more readily detected in future ToM performance.   
 Language abilities may also play a role in the finding that participants in the ASD group 
had more instances of non-response.  The ASD groups’ higher frequency of non-response was 
expected due to the lack of social bias suggested by Gottleib & Halpern (2002) with the Coactive 
Organism Experience Theory of Autism and the sensory integration challenges associated with 
ASD.  The latter may have reduced the ASD group’s ability to self-regulate and inhibit urges that 
may have directed their focus away from the interaction with their caregivers (Gomez & Baird, 
2005).   
 In contrast, we did not expect that the ASD group would use gesture without gaze and 
gaze without gesture at a similar rate as the TD group.  While studies have described deficits in 
gesturing in ASD (Clements & Chawarska, 2010), there is literature that suggests that 
protoimperative pointing (to indicate a desire an object) is generally intact in children with 
autism (Baron-Cohen, 1989).  This, in combination with the fact that only one participant from 
each group used gesture without gaze, may explain why the ASD and TD groups had similar use 
of this type of communication bid.  The similar performance with the use of eye gaze was not 
expected.  Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer, & Sherman (1986) found 3 to 6 year olds with autism had 
more difficulty using gaze to navigate social situations, as compared to their peers with other 
developmental delays or typical development.  These difficulties occurred specifically with  
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splitting attention between an object and a conversational partner.  But when examining literature 
on the development of joint attention, there is evidence that children with ASD follow a different 
sequence of development.  They utilize coordinated looks more frequently before a 20-month 
expressive language age and begin utilizing gestures, such as pointing more frequently when 
they reach an expressive language age of 21 months and beyond (Paparella et al., 2011).  This 
contrasts with their typically developing peers who used both coordinated looks and gestures 
frequently before an expressive language age of 20 months.  The patterns seen within this study 
support that proposed trajectory of development.  The ASD children within the current study had 
the ability to use gaze on a basic levels to get their needs met, while their peers with TD 
produced communication bids with more complexity (i.e., gaze with gesture), rather than relying 
solely on one mode of communication to achieve their goals.  
 It would also make sense that preschoolers with children with ASD used gestures 
(without gaze) and gaze (without gesture) similarly to their typically developing peers.  Children 
with ASD in this study may have used gesture or gaze in place of words, due to the expressive 
language delays associated with ASD.  Further examination of the variety of gestures and 
complexity of gaze as compared to their TD peers may reveal that differences in performance 
between the groups underlie these general similarities. 
  
Communication bids in each condition with combined groups  
Both the ASD and TD groups’ scores when examined together, showed that the 
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participants used slightly more gesture-gaze combinations on average on the closed-eye trials.  
The finding was unexpected for the TD group based on the results of O’Neill’s study, the early 
emergence of intentional communication in typical development (Wetherby, Cain, Yonclas, & 
Walker, 1988) and what we know of typically developing children’s use of a variety of 
communication to get their needs met (Goldwin-Meadow, 1999).  A larger sample size and 
additional trials within the experimental task may have lead to greater detection of early ToM 
and replication of O’Neill’s findings.   
There was also no significant difference in the ASD and TD groups average use of gaze 
(without gestures) during the open-eye and closed-eye trials.  This finding was not expected.  
These findings suggest that the experimental task may require alterations to improve its 
sensitivity, a larger sample size and that children of this age range indeed have immature ToM.   
!
Communication bids within each condition comparing groups  
 We expected to see less tailoring of communicative acts based on the knowledge state of 
caregivers with the ASD group in comparison with their TD peers.  But results showed that both 
groups showed little variation in their communicative behaviors across conditions when 
compared to their peers or when their own performance in conditions in which their caregiver’s 
eyes where closed or open was examined. 
Therefore, our measure was not explicitly sensitive to the presence of ToM in 2-3 year 
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old children with ASD and TD.  O’Neill’s (1996) Study 2 experimental task, upon which the 
current study is derived from, presented six experimental trials following three practice trials.  It 
is believed that a larger sample of participants and an increased number of trials on the 
experimental task could lead to more sensitivity of this measure, as the difference between the 
groups’ use of gesture and gaze combinations was significant.  This may suggest that when 
caregiver knowledge reduced, as in the closed-eye task, the children with autism may have more 
difficulty using communication bids of increasing complexity as compared to their peers.  The 
lack of a significant difference in the participants’ performance when comparing open versus 
close-eye trails may also indicate that ToM skills are skill emerging and quite tentative in 2-year-
olds with TD and difficult to detect with a small sample. 
The TD group used more gesture-gaze combinations than the ASD group during the 
closed-eye condition.  This  finding was expected.  The frequent instances of no response as 
compared with the TD group were also expected due to the linguistic and sensory challenges 
associated with ASD. These results, in combination with higher frequency of non-responses from 
the ASD group during the closed task, give the most support to the possibility of this alternative 
task as being a sensitive instrument for assessing ToM in young children.  While the instances of 
non-response were significantly different between groups, the ASD group failed to respond at 
generally the same rate during both the open and closed trials. The higher frequency of non-
responses in the ASD group across conditions is consistent with research that suggest that 
children with autism do not have a complete lack of responsiveness in their interactions with 
their caregivers, but rather have variable performance around indicating behaviors involved with 
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sharing experiences with partners (Sigman, Mundy, Sherman, & Ungerer, 1986).  Although the 
children with ASD had more instances of non-response than their peers with TD, as a group they 
had a greater number of overall trials in which they did attempt to communicate with their 
caregivers. This indicates that for the majority of opportunities, they were attempting to interact 
with their conversational partners. 
 Due to the issues with engagement (Pan, 2009) and sensory integration observed in 
children with ASD, it was surprising to find that the ASD group used a similar rate of  gaze 
without gesture as the TD group given the atypical visual preferences reported with children with 
ASD.  Children with ASD may not consistently use gaze to connect with or respond to their 
communication partners.  In addition, children with autism may have notable affinities and 
aversions for a variety of sensory information (e.g., auditory, tactile) including visual 
information.  In social interactions, children with autism may devote more visual attention to 
local images (e.g., nose, mouth) rather than taking in images holistically (Behrmann, Thomas, & 
Humphreys, 2006).  So, the finding that children with ASD in this study used of gaze without 
gesture at a similar rate to their peers was not expected. 
!
!
Communication bids related to child gaze directed to caregiver  
This study’s most interesting findings were revealed when examining the participants’ 
performance based on the percentage of trials in which they looked at their caregivers. We 
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predicted that the children who looked at their caregivers to see if their eyes where closed or 
opened more frequently during the examiner’s instructions would use more gesture and gaze 
combinations during the closed-eye task when their caregivers had less knowledge of their 
surroundings.  It turned out to be their use of gaze without gesture that showed the most notable 
patterns.   
Only three participants failed to look at their caregiver following examiner instructions 
during 50% or more of the experimental trials.  All three of these participants were from the ASD 
group.  But this also means that the majority of the participants in the ASD group were actively 
using gaze within the majority of the trials to interact.  Considering the research on engagement 
and the atypical visual preferences of children with autism, this finding speaks to their potential 
for using gaze in social exchanges.  Also, these three participants did not use gestures without 
gaze at all while they used gaze without gesture more frequently than their peers during the 
closed-eye trials.  These findings were not expected based on the literature on the gaze patterns 
of children with ASD.  Children with ASD are believed to have different preferences in regards 
to gaze directed to faces (Pelphrey at al., 2002). Still, in this study these three preschoolers with 
ASD used gaze by itself to get their needs met slightly more frequently than the children with 
TD.  This again may be related to the higher average expressive language scores that the TD 
group received on the Mullen which put them in the position to combine more modes of 
communication (i.e., gestures+gaze+verbalizations) to get their needs met versus relying on a 
single mode to do so. When looking at the mean scores of this subset of 3 participants, they 
scored below the average performance score of the ASD group and the TD group on the Visual 
 59
Reception and Receptive Language subtest of the Mullen. These three participants also scored 
below the TD group (M=59.1) for their average score for the Expressive Language subtest, while 
they scored similarly (M=39.3) on this subtest to the overall participants with ASD (M=39.1). 
Given that only 3 out of the 10 children with ASD used more gaze without gesture than their 
peers, it will be important to examine a larger sample of children to see if a subset will show this 
pattern and to see what other factors correlate with the different pattern of communication. The 
ASD groups’ observed similar use of gaze without gesture, as compared to the TD group, was 
likely enhanced by the performance of this subset of three participants. 
The most notable relationship between Mullen performance and child gaze directed to 
caregiver during instructions was between percentage of trials looked during instructions and 
receptive language.  This is understandable as there was the least amount of overlap between the 
performance of those 3 participants in the ASD groups who looked at their caregivers on 3 or 
fewer trials during instructions and the performance of their typically developing peers on the 
Receptive Language subtest (See Figure 5).  It is not surprising that children with poorer 
receptive language skills would attend less during verbal instructions.  
 While these three participants with ASD, who showed the unusual behavior, generally 
used less gaze than their peers to attend to their caregivers during instructions, they used gaze 
without gesture more frequently than their peers to attempt to control the behaviors of their 
caregivers.  Still, they used gaze without gesture on average during the closed-eye (M=2, 
SD=1.73) and open-eye trials (M=2.33, SD=.58) at similar rates.  This again suggests that the 
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alternative task with reduced linguistic and cognitive load used for this study may lack sufficient 
sensitivity to examine the presence of theory of mind and its precursors in young children in its 
current form. It may also mean that we were unable to replicate O’Neill’s findings because two 
and three-year-olds indeed have immature ToM. 
!
Limitations 
This study set out to examine ToM and the precursors of ToM in preschoolers with and 
without autism with the belief that the experimental task would be sensitive to both.   The lack of 
significant differences in performance being found between the closed and open tasks in both the 
TD and ASD groups in the current study suggests that the task employed is not as sensitive as 
expected in examining precursors to ToM or that ToM is actually immature in 2 and 3-year-olds.  
It is likely the sample size limited the power to detect real difference that may be present.  
Another potential limitation of the proposed study is that vigilant monitoring of parent behavior 
(in addition to participant behavior) was required during the experimental task.  The 
experimental task procedures might be altered, so that the physical space for the assessment task 
is changed to require less physical positioning of the examiner and visual cues from the examiner 




Clinical implications and directions for future research:  
 The results of this study appear to support the idea the cognitive mechanism of ToM is 
present but immature at chronological and developmental ages that precede four years of age as 
suggested by the performance-based model of ToM.  In this study, there was a reduction of the 
cognitive (e.g., working memory, inhibition) and linguistic (e.g., use of short directives) load 
used in the experimental task as compared to false-belief tasks that have been used with children 
prior to four years old.  It is at this age when notable shifts are expected in executive functions 
such as memory and inhibition as suggested by the performance-based model of ToM.    The 
children were able to demonstrate precursors to ToM without direct instruction or a change in 
knowledge about mental representations that is expected at 4 years old within the theory-shift 
model of ToM.  However, these two models need not be mutually exclusive.  It is possible that 
the reduced memory and linguistic load as well as the limited need for inhibition during the play 
task, put younger learners in a better position to demonstrate precursors to theory of mind (e.g., 
gaze) within a context (i.e., requesting a toy) with which they already had experience. 
 However, we did see fewer communicative acts in the group of participants with ASD.  
So the experimental task used in this study does tell us even with reduced cognitive and 
linguistic load, the children with ASD still communicated with less complexity that their peers 
with TD.  This result of this experiment can affect the way we approach assessment of children 
and can also affect how and when we approach treatment.   This study’s findings support the 
need to initiate therapeutic intervention early as difference between the children with ASD and 
TD were already seen in children 3 years of age and younger. 
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 Given the unusual performance around the use of gaze of the three participants in the 
subset of the ASD group, it would be warranted to follow the children longitudinally to examine 
whether performance at this age with precursors to theory of mind will predict later ToM or 
linguistic abilities. Understanding that children with ASD have the potential to initiate gaze for 
communicative purposes can affect the course of a variety of therapeutic professionals’ 
intervention activities and behavior reinforcement.  Interventionists should now consider that 
children with ASD may be subtly using gaze to communicate, although they may not be as adept 
at following gaze or shifting their gaze to respond to joint attention bids. With this increased 
awareness, clinicians will be in a better position to reinforce communication bids in order to 
strengthening engagement and reciprocity and reduce frustration during social exchanges. 
Examining the individual differences in the performance of the children with autism in 
this study might contribute to future understanding about the pragmatic language development of 
children with autism.  Regardless of their cognitive abilities, language use is an area that all 
children with autism have challenges with.  It is suggested that these challenges are associated 
with being able to make inferences about the mental states of others (Loveland, Tunali, McEvoy, 
& Kelley, 1989).  So, one area for future examination would be to look at qualitative aspects of 
the language of children with ASD who received average expressive language quantitative scores 
during this study.  Looking at the quality of their productions, such as how often they used 
scripted language or the number of instances of echolalia, can be examined. Their performance 
can be  compared to that of their peers with TD who received lower expressive language scores 
and their ASD peers who used scripted language or echolalia.  Although these production types 
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are less original, they do often indicate an understanding about and an attempt to maintain a 
conversational exchange.  It would then be interesting to see if those participants with ASD who 
used echolalia and scripted language in this study will have better pragmatic language skills and 
demonstrate theory of mind more frequently when they reach school-age.  It will be important to 
see whether toddlers with ASD demonstrating ToM precursors will be those who show less 
severe ASD behaviors at later ages and those who respond better to therapy.  
!
Summary and conclusions 
 In this study, typically developing learners used more combined modes of communication 
(i.e., gesture and gaze) across conditions.  But when looking at the combined communication 
bids of all participants, average performance was similar in both the closed and open-eye 
conditions.  This suggests that stronger evidence is needed to show that this alternative task is a 
viable means of examining precursors to theory of mind in young children or that children at this 
age simply have immature ToM.  The subtle patterns observed in the use of gaze by the children 
with ASD in this study support the notion that methodological approaches used by researchers 
can affect assessment of ToM in young children.  The children with ASD did not have variable 
performance associated with caregiver knowledge, still minimizing the cognitive and linguistic 
demands of ToM assessment tasks resulted in a more accurate picture of the abilities of children 
with ASD.   
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 The children with TD did not significantly alter the complexity of their communication 
between the open and closed-eye trials as compared with the ASD group.  This study’s 
experimental task did not support or refute the idea that children with ASD depart from typical 
patterns of social communication very early in development in terms of ToM.  Still, the 
significant frequency of non-response by the ASD group as compared with the TLD group 
suggest that children with ASD may benefit from therapeutic programs that target engagement 
and reciprocity as building blocks to social communication. 
 Most interestingly, the majority of the participants in this study’s ASD group were 
actively using gaze within the better part of the trials to gain information about their 
conversational partner.  This speaks to their potential for using gaze in communicative 
exchanges. Three of this study’s participants who failed to look at their caregiver following 
examiner instructions in 50% or more of the experimental trials were all from the ASD group.  
These three children all used gaze without gesture more frequently than their peers during the 
closed-eye trials.  They generally used less gaze to attend to their caregivers overall, but used 
gaze without gesture more frequently than their peers to attempt to communicate with their 
caregivers using gaze shifts when their caregivers had limited knowledge about where the toy 
was.  The examination of this cohort has revealed the circumstances under which precursors to 
theory of mind might be revealed using this task with reduced linguistic and cognitive load. This 
use of gaze at a higher frequency than using gestures such as pointing supports current literature 
which suggests a different sequence for development of joint attention skills (which are 
precursors to the development of theory of mind) for ASD children in comparison with their 
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typically developing peers.  
 Overall evidence from this study indicates that examining precursors to ToM may be a 
viable method for understanding ToM in young children. My findings support the idea that 
following this study’s participants’ performance longitudinally and further analysis of this 
study’s data are warranted.  Further analysis over time may determine whether this alternative 
task can be a tool to explore the development of theory of mind and the precursors to it in 
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